Marquette Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 1 Summer 1954

Article 9

Landlord and Tenant - Leases - The Validity of Rent
Acceleration Clauses
Daniel O. Howard

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Daniel O. Howard, Landlord and Tenant - Leases - The Validity of Rent Acceleration Clauses, 38 Marq. L. Rev. 53 (1954).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol38/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

1954-55]

RECENT DECISIONS

a reasonable time. Although this may work a heavy hardship upon a
promisor who is forced to pay before he feels himself able, to hold
such language as a condition precedent would work a heavier hardship upon a promisee who might never receive value for what he has
given. However, the hardship on the promisor could be lightened, to a
certain extent at least, by construing a reasonable time most liberally
in favor of the promisor. To the average person this would seem the
fairest of two difficult alternatives. He would consider such a promise
as one requiring payment at some time.
Thus in the light of the balancing of the hardships and an attempt
at substantial justice, the Wisconsin court in any future decision
should, it seems, follow the lead of the Iowa court in Sanford v. Luce.
C. WILIAM IsAAcsoN

Landlord and Tenant-Leases-The Validity of Rent Acceleration Clauses-The plaintiff leased premises to the defendant for
a three year period, rent payable monthly in advance. Under the
terms of the lease,' the lessor, without demand or notice, could lawfully declare the term ended and re-enter the premises should the lessee default in any of his contractual obligations. Furthermore, the
lessor had an option, in addition to his other remedies on default, to
give the lessee written notice of any default or neglect and to advise
the lessee that unless all the conditions and covenants of the lease were
complied with within thirty days, the entire rent for the remainder
of the term would become immediately due and payable. Eight months
after the beginning of the term, the lessee vacated the premises and
shortly thereafter defaulted in the payment of the rent due. The lessor
brought an action for rent on the rent acceleration clause in the lease.
Judgment was rendered for the lessor, and the lessee appealed. Held:
Judgment for the plaintiff reversed. Any clause in a lease of real
property for rent acceleration effective upon the breach of a covenant
to pay rent is void since it is either an agreement for liquidated damages, when the damages are readily ascertainable, or a penalty. Ricker
v. Rombough, 261 P. 2d 328 (Cal. 1953).

The courts are not in agreement concerning the validity of rent
I "Lessor may likewise at lessor's option and in addition to any other remedies
which lessor may have upon such default, failure or neglect, give to lessee
written notice of such default, failure or neglect and advise lessee thereby
that, unless all the terms, covenants and conditions of the lease are fully
complied with within thirty (30) days after giving of said notice, the entire amount of rent herein reserved or agreed to be paid and then remaining unpaid shall immediately become due and payable upon the expiration of
said thirty days. .. "
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acceleration clauses.2 Jurisdictions in agreement with the instant
case usually view such a clause as an attempt to provide for liquidated
damages where such damages are not determined with any relation to
the actual harm suffered. Thus, the clause is held to be an unenforceable penalty. Pomeroy in his work on Equity states that equity will
step in to forbid penalties or forfeitures in certain cases:
"Whenever a penalty or a forfeiture is used merely to secure
the payment of a debt, or the performance of some act, or the
enjoyment of some right or benefit, equity, considering the payment, or performance, or enjoyment to be the real thing intended by the agreement, and the penalty or forfeiture to be
only an accessory, will relieve against such penalty or forfeiture by awarding compensation instead thereof, proportionate
to the damages actually resulting from the non-payment or nonperformance, or non-enjoyment, according to the stipulations of
the agreement." 4
The test used by equity is whether compensation can or cannot be
adequately made for breach of the obligation which is secured. If
the penalty secures the payment of money, compensation can always
be made by paying the principal and interest. If it secures the performance of some collateral act, and compensation for the non-performance can be made, equity will award damages and then relieve
the defaulting party of any further liability. 5
In Gentry v. Recreation, Inc., the court drew a distinction between
the acceleration of an ordinary debt and the acceleration of rent. In
the case of an ordinary debt, the court declared, the debtor has already received the entire consideration either in money or property,
while a rent acceleration requires payment for something the debtor
has not received.6
Notwithstanding the arguments advanced in behalf of voiding acceleration clauses on equity principles, such agreements have been held
in many instances to be valid.7 The reasoning of the courts upholding
2 For a complete discussion, see notes, 58 A.L.R. 300; 128 A.L.R. 750.
3Note, 106 A.L.R. 292,293: The distinction between liquidated damages and a
penalty is that a penalty is a surety for non-performance while liquidated
damages are damages to be paid in the event of non-performance. Factors
often considered by the courts in determining whether a pecuniary forfeiture is for liquidated damages or a penalty are; (a) the reasonableness of
the stipulated sum in relation to probable damages, (b) the difficulty in as-

certaining actual damages and (c) the importance of the breaches covered by

the same forfeiture.

ed., Symons 1941).
6 192 S.C. 429, 7 S.E. 2d 63 (1940).
7Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222 (1934); Hoefer v. Fortmann,
219 Iowa 746, 259 N.W. 494 (1935); Shepard Realty Co. v. United Shoe
4

2 POMEROY, EQUITY §433 (5th

5Ibid.

Stores Co., 193 La. 211, 190 So. 383 (1939); Abel v. Paterno, 245 App. Div.
285, 281 N.Y.S. 58 (1935); Moretti v. Zanfino, 127 P. Super. 286, 193 A.
106 (1937); Logan v. Green, 53 S.W. 2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §3.74 (1952).
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the validity of rent acceleration provisions is that since the parties
might legally contract to pay all the rent in advance, they may also
agree on the acceleration of such rent on the happen'ng of stated
contingencies."
New York has held that a contract accelerating rent on the breach
of a covenant to pay rent is a penalty.9 However, in the Belnord case,
the court opened the door for a valid acceleration clause which hinged
on the mere wording of the clause. In that case, the lease provided
that the rent for the whole term was payable at the time of the making
of the lease, 'but provided that it could be paid in stated installments
for the lessee's convenience unless there was a default in the installments. If there was such a default, the entire rent was accelerated.
This acceleration clause was held to be valid since the parties had liberty to contract and could validly agree to pay all the rent in advance.
The court stated that the fact that another clause in the lease permitted
monthly installments could not render what was otherwise valid a
penalty.' 0
Many courts are reluctant to enforce a rent acceleration clause
where the lessor re-enters the premises and takes possession of them
before the end of the term."1 Such a provision has often been considered unreasonable and unenforceable. However, in Erickson v.
O'Leary, where the lessor accepted possession of farm land upon
the default of the lessee and sued for the accelerated rent, the court
held the acceleration clause valid and declared that the lessor need not
2
let the land go fallow.'
A second circumstance which may invalidate an otherwise enforceable acceleration provision is the presence in the lease of a multiplicity of trivial terms or covenants the breach of which will accelerate
the remaining rent for the term. The New York court held that a lease
with exhaustive restrictions left the lessee at the mercy of the lessor
for any breach of a trivial nature. Some restrictions were held to be
so trivial and so lacking in any real damages that the court would not
3
allow any acceleration of rent.'
WISCONSIN VIEW

The status of rent acceleration clauses in Wisconsin has not been
definitely determined in all respects. Indeed, only one case on this
852 C.J.S. §512; 32 Am. JuR. §§463, 464.
9 884 West End Ave. Corp. v. Pearlman, 201 App. Div. 415, 198 N.Y.S. 670, 673
(1922).
' 0 Belnord Realty Co. v. Levinson, 204 App. Div. 12, 193 N.Y.S. 184, 186 (1923).
"1 Maddox v. Hobbie, supra, note 7 at 226; Pirkle & Williams v. Shreveport
Jitney Jungle, 19 La. App. 729, 140 So. 837, 840 (1932); 58 A.L.R. at 306;
32 Am. JUR. §465.
12 127 Kan. 12, 273 P. 414, 415 (1929); accord, Sliman v. Fish, 177 La. 38,
147 So. 493 (1933).
13 Supra, note 9.
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subject has been adjudicated in the state. 14 It would be wise before
discussing this case to consider Wisconsin court decisions in an analogous field, the liability of a lessee for future rents upon default.
The court considered this problem in the Selts cases. The first Selts
case 5 involved a lease which contained a clause which provided that
if there was a default in the payment of rent or on any of the covenants or agreements, it would be lawful for the lessor to declare the
term at an end and re-enter without prejudice to any remedies which
might otherwise be used for arrears in rent or breach of covenant.
Such re-entry was not to affect the liability of the lessee for past
rent due or future rent to accrue under the lease. Payments of the
rent were to be made monthly in advance. The lessee failed to pay
the rent in September, and the lessor gave him a three day statutory
notice to pay his rent or vacate the premises. The lessee vacated the
premises on the 15th of September. The lessor then brought an action
for the rent due and unpaid for that month. The court noted that under
the lease the rent was due September 1st and that had the lessee paid
the month's rent in advance and then vacated, he could not have recovered that money:
"It thus becomes evident that it was not contemplated by the
legislature when it enacted the unlawful detainer statutes that
an election on the part of the lessee to surrender would in any
way affect his obligation to pay
whatever rent had become due
16
and which remained unpaid.'

The second Selts case1- was based upon the same facts as the
first case, but was an action for future rent based on the clause allowing collection of such rents. Three months rent was involved. The
court held that where premises were surrendered by the lessee and accepted by the lessor, the lease was terminated with the result that no
basis existed to warrant any further rents.
There was a rehearing, however, in which the prior opinion was
reversed. It was determined that the common law was not abrogated
by the statutory provisions in question and that the lease thus authorized a suit for future rents:
"The lessee, however, expressly covenanted in the lease that
it would pay the rent for the entire term in accordance with the
provisions of the lease, forfeiture or no forfeiture, so that,
while the relationship of landlord and tenant ceased with the
forfeiture, the contractual relation between these parties con14Patton v. Milwaukee Commercial Bank, 222 Wis. 167, 268 N.W. 124 (1936).
'5

Selts Investment Co. v. Promoters of F.N. of W., 197 Wis. 471, 220 N.W.

220 (1928).
i6 Id. at 475.
Selts Investment Co. v. Promoters of F.N. of W., 197 Wis. 476, 220 N.W.
222, 222 N.W. 812 (1929).

',
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tinued. Therefore, the acceptance of the premises by the plaintiff .. .manifested a termination of the landlord and tenant
relationship, 'but had no effect whatsoever ' upon
the liability of
8
the lessee for subsequently accruing rents.' 1
The court cited 36 C.J. at 336 to the effect that a tenant may continue
to be liable after the termination of included provisions imposing
liability for rent. The decision stated that this is the prevailing view
supported by overwhelming authority and was persuasive of the
court's error in the prior opinion.29 The court went on to hold, however, that in these cases, the lessor had an obligation to re-enter the
20
premises in order to lease them again and thus mitigate damages.
Anderson v. Andy Darling Pontiac21 is the latest Wisconsin decision on this subject. The lease provided that on the breach of any
terms, the lessors could re-enter and take possession of the premises
without such re-entry working a forfeiture of the rents to be paid
and the covenants to be kept by the lessee. The court cited Selts case
to the effect that a clause for the payment of "rent" unaccrued at the
time of re-entry permitted the mere recovery of damages. Then the
court continued:
"The provision in the lease here involved for the payment of
the unaccrued rent in case of breach by the lessee is in realty
a penalty entirely disproportionate to any damage that could
reasonably be expected to ensue ... ,,22
The court declared that it was in accord with the Kothe case 23 and
24
had been led to its decision by the result in the Selts case.
The Wisconsin court in this decision relied heavily on two decisions
5
which have been distinguished on their facts. The Pearlman case
out of New York held against an acceleration clause because of the
multiplicity of acceleration contingencies.26 The Kothe case, a Federal
decision, involved the acceleration of all rent due for the duration
of the term upon the bankruptcy of the tenant. The court pointed out
that the parties thus contracted for payment to be made out of the
bankrupt estate and not for something the lessee personally would be
required to pay. Thus, it appeared that the real design was to obtain
preferential treatment for the lessor in the event of -bankruptcy, and
this the court held to be against the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act. The
court indicated ,however that had the facts shown a proper purpose or
isId.at 484.
19
20 Ibid.
21

Supra, note 17 at 486.
Anderson v. Andy Darling Pontiac, Inc., 257 Wis. 371, 43 N.W. 2d 362 (1950):

22Id. at 364.

23Kothe v. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224 (1930).
24 Supra, note 21 at 364
25
26

Supra, note 9.
Ibid.
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the term been shorter the argument for the lessor would have been
more persuasive27

The only case in which the acceleration of rent problem has
arisen is Patton v. Milwaukee Commercial Bank.2 0 The lease gave
the lessor an option in case of default by the lessee to declare all the
rent for the term due and payable. The court held that as a claim for
future rent, no debt could arise until the installments became due.
Speaking of the rent acceleration clause, the court said:
"It is at all events plain that it is a penalty and not a provision
for liquidated damages. It is applicable to a breach of the least
important covenant of the lease as it is to its complete abandonment or repudiation, and even with respect to the latter, it must
be considered to be grossly in excess of the damages reasonably
to be anticipated as a result of the breach. For this reason it cannot be considered a bona fide effort to liquidate damages. It follows it must be a penalty, and, as such, it is not enforceable.

' 28

CONCLUSION

The Wisconsin court would thus seem to be in accord with the
main case. Nor does it appear likely that the court will adopt the decision in the Belnord case. The second Selts case could have been used
as precedent for such a holding, but language appearing in the Darling
case makes it apparent that the present supreme court would not have
allowed the recovery in the second Selts case.
"The court might properly have added, as has been observed
by courts of other jurisdictions, that such a stipulation in a lease
is an agreement for a penalty;
that it is unreasonable in char29
acter and therefore void."

But even were a rent acceleration clause held to be valid, does it
give a lessor any adequate remedy for the breach of a lease? If the
lessor accepts the accelerated rents, he must stay out of possession of
the leasehold and subject himself to possible deterioration of the premises and other hazards attendant upon his prolonged exclusion from
the property. And staying out of possession, even considering that the
lessor has the rents for the remainder of the term, is no advantage
to him unless the remainder of the term is short. In Wisconsin, it is
clear that the lessor would have to enter the leasehold as a trustee for
the lessee and give a strict account to the lessee of all rents as a mitigation of damages.
What the lessor really seeks are damages for the breach of the
lease and the right to re-enter the premises. In the Patton decision,
the court stated that future damages upon the breach of a lease were
27 Supra, note 23 at 227.
28 Supra, note 14 at 126.
29 Supra, note 21 at 375.
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too contingent, conjectural and speculative to be determined. The court
imposes upon the re-entering lessor a painful dilemma: either he will
be held, prima facie, accountable for the same rent which the lessee was
obligated to pay, on the assumption that the lease-rents are the best
"guess" of the value of the leasehold, or else he will be forced to
prove an unprovable-that the lease will not be dissolved during the
balance of the term by the operation of Section 234.17 of the Wiscon°
sin Statutes.3
It is submitted that the question of awarding damages for the
breach of a lease should be reconsidered by the Wisconsin court. Acceleration clauses were originally designed as a means of avoiding the
old rule that a lessor could not treat the lessee's refusal to pay rent
as an anticipatory breach of the contract. 31 But since the Wisconsin
court has adopted the anticipatory breach theory in lease cases, 32 the
need of an acceleration clause has withered. Upon the substantial
breach of the contract, the lessor may treat the non-performance as
an anticipatory breach and bring suit at once for damages. The damages, however, are limited to those incurred up to the time of trial. 33
Are the obstacles really too great to have competent realtors estimate
the reasonable rental value of the leasehold for the remainder of the
term? This amount, when determined from evidence, could then be
subtracted from the contractual rental value as the measure of damages. As for the leasehold being substantially destroyed, this is really
a very remote contingency and one that could be compensated for by
the use of insurance tables .This plan would thus give the lessor an
adequate remedy for the breach and preclude the burdensome task
of his becoming a trustee to *mitigate damages.
This solution would seem to be not only feasible, but would do
justice and equity to both landlord and tenant. Furthermore, it would
circumvent the problem of rent acceleration, a lessor's remedy which
has been neither satisfactory to landlords nor equitable to tenants.
DANIEL

0. HowARD

30 "Where any building, which is leased or occupied, is destroyed or so injured

by the elements, or any other cause as to be untenantable, and unfit for occupancy, and no express agreement to the contrary has been made in writing, the lessee or occupant may, if the destruction or injury occurred without his fault or neglect, quit and surrender possession of the leasehold premises, and of the land so leased or occupied; and he is not liable to pay to the
lessor or owner, rent for the time subsequent to the surrender."
31 1 AMmcIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra, note 7.
32 Galvin v. Lovell, 257 Wis. 82, 42 N.W. 2d 456 (1950).
3
3 Ibid.

